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CONTRACTS – MINES AND MINERALS: NORTH DAKOTA
REJECTS EXTENTIONS OF OIL PRODUCTION CONTRACTS
ON UNUSED LAND
Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 2014 ND 123, 848 N.W.2d 691
ABSTRACT
In Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., the North Dakota Supreme Court
held that the drilling operations clause of an oil and gas lease failed to
preserve the operator’s right to extend the lease over unused portions of the
land in the presence of an enforceable Pugh clause. The court, reviewing a
district court summary judgment decision quieting title to Greggory Tank,
reasoned that a failure to allow the Pugh clause to govern the drilling
operations clause would make the Pugh clause wholly ineffective.
Therefore, the court’s holding in Tank focused on the Pugh clause language
describing the severability of the parcel from the rest of the leasehold. Tank
provides a clear avenue to landowners who wish to terminate oil and gas
leases on parcels of land where no drilling operations have recently
occurred, even if drilling operations have continued under the same lease on
adjoining parcels.
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FACTS

In 1982, George and Phyllis Tank signed an oil and gas lease with a
three-year primary term covering property in McKenzie County, North
Dakota.1 Although the parties ratified an extension of the primary term
through 1989, production on the property continued for many years.2 The
Tank’s successor, Greggory Tank, filed a lawsuit in district court in 2011
against the operators under the lease seeking a determination that the oil and

1. Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 2014 ND 123, ¶ 2, 848 N.W. 2d 691, 694.
2. Id.
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gas lease had lapsed on the southwest quarter of the property.3 The Citation
Oil & Gas Corporation and the other oil and gas operators under the lease
filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that production on other
portions of the property under the lease was sufficient to hold the entire
lease in effect during the period.4 Tank filed a cross-motion for summary
judgment and argued that, under the Pugh clause of the lease, the operator’s
failure to maintain production on the southwest quarter of the property
allowed it to be severed.5
The district court denied the operator’s motion for summary judgment
and sided with Tank, determining that the lapse in production on the
southwest quarter was sufficient to cancel the lease.6 The court found that,
between October 1, 2008 and October 30, 2009, production ceased on the
southwest quarter, justifying the quieting of title in Tank.7 The defendants
appealed the district court’s decision.8
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Although oil and gas leases follow the rules of interpretation for
contracts in general,9 courts must consider additional legal rules when
interpreting them. Specifically, oil and gas contracts must address concerns
for conservation of oil and gas and the protection of correlative rights.10
The rule of capture11 created a regime which encouraged over drilling and
the premature dissipation of natural reservoir energy.12 Conservation
regulation, including pooling or unitization of oil and gas leases, is one way
policymakers have attempted to address these concerns.13 However, even
as pooling or unitization has promoted the preservation of the entirety of an
oil and gas lease to protect correlative rights, the lessor’s ability to obtain
revenue on a non-producing, non-pooled portion of the leased property has
been jeopardized.14 Absent a Pugh clause, a lessor’s only alternative would
3. Id. ¶ 6.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. ¶ 7, 848 N.W.2d at 694-95.
7. Id. at 695.
8. Id. ¶ 1, 848 N.W.2d at 694.
9. Egeland v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 2000 ND 169, ¶ 10, 616 N.W.2d 861, 864.
10. BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION §
2.01 (3d ed. 2014).
11. Under the rule of capture, “the owner of a tract of land acquires title to the oil or gas
which he produces from wells on his land, though part of the oil or gas may have migrated from
adjoining lands.” Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 561-62 (Tex. 1948).
12. KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 10, at § 2.01.
13. Id.
14. Id. at § 9.01
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be under the implied covenant of reasonable development.15 The North
Dakota Supreme Court’s first impression of the effect of a Pugh clause on
an oil and gas lease occurred in Egeland v. Continental Resources, Inc.16
A. POOLING AND UNITIZATION OF OIL PRODUCTION UNITS
Pooling and unitization of oil production units began as a method of
protecting correlative rights.17 Pooling can have a significant impact on the
duration of a lease.18 A “principal effect of the pooling or the unitization of
a lease in most states is to preserve the entire lease even if only a portion,
however small, of the lease is included in the unit.”19 Pooling, therefore,
can create quite harsh consequences for the lessor, whose interest may be
diluted by having only a small portion of his leased land included in a
pooled unit with other interests.20 Even if the well is on the property of
another in the pooled unit, the lessor may be disadvantaged by having the
lease continue on the remaining non-pooled portions of his or her lease,
removing an incentive for the lessee to continue development on that
portion of the property.21
In North Dakota, pooling can be either voluntary or forced by the
North Dakota Industrial Commission (“Commission”) order under North
Dakota Century Code section 38-08-08(1).22 If the pooling is voluntary,
then the parties with interests in the pool have the opportunity to set up the
contract to address concerns they may have. On the other hand, if the
pooling is forced by an order from the Commission, the pooling is required
to be set up in a way that ensures each owner will receive his or her “just
and equitable share.”23 The Legislature tasked the Commission with
encouraging the production of oil and gas while protecting correlative rights
through efforts such as pooling.24

15. See Hermon Hanson Oil Syndicate v. Bentz, 40 N.W.2d 304, 307-08 (N.D. 1949).
16. 2000 ND 169, ¶ 15, 616 N.W.2d 861, 866.
17. KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 10, at § 2.02.
18. EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 26.13 (2014).
19. Egeland, ¶ 16, 616 N.W.2d at 866 (quoting KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 10, at §
9.01).
20. See Will-Drill Res., Inc. v. Huggs, Inc., 738 So. 2d 1196, 1200 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
21. KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 10, at § 9.01.
22. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-08(1) (2014) (stating that “[w]hen two or more separately
owned tracts are embraced within a spacing unit, or when there are separately owned interests in
all or a part of the spacing unit, then the owners and royalty owners thereof may pool their
interests for the development and operation of the spacing unit. In the absence of voluntary
pooling, the commission upon the application of any interested person shall enter an order pooling
all interests in the spacing unit for the development and operations thereof.”).
23. Id.
24. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-07(1) (2014).
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B. THE INDIVISIBILITY OF OIL AND GAS LEASES AND THE
PURPOSE OF THE PUGH CLAUSE
To identify how a Pugh clause may affect the pooling of a lease, one
must examine the rules of interpretation for oil and gas leases. The same
rules that govern interpretation of general contractual agreements also
govern the interpretation of oil and gas contracts.25 Words in an oil and gas
contract are construed in their “ordinary and popular sense” unless the
parties defined the terms or used them in a technical sense.26 Contracts are
also read in light of existing statutes, with the statute read into the contract
as if it were a term.27 Contracts are interpreted, if possible, to give effect to
every provision.28 Lastly, a contract must also be considered in its entirety
to determine the true intent of the parties.29
Oil and gas contracts, however, have additional legal rules. Normally,
an oil and gas lease is indivisible by its nature.30 Operations on, or
production from, any part of the land in an oil and gas lease will ordinarily
extend the entire lease beyond the primary term.31 If part or all of the land
under a lease is pooled, production anywhere in the pool is normally
sufficient to extend the lease, even if the production is not on the leased
land.32 Lastly, an oil and gas lease is often construed in favor of the lessor
because the lessee normally drafts the lease.33
In 1947, a Louisiana lawyer named Pugh drafted a clause intended to
prevent the lessor’s unpooled land from being disadvantaged by production
on pooled lands.34 The purpose of what is now known as a “Pugh” clause is
“to protect the lessor from the anomaly of having the entire property held

25. Egeland, ¶ 10, 616 N.W.2d at 864.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-06 (2014) (“The whole of a contract is to be taken together so
as to give effect to every part if reasonably practicable. Each clause is to help interpret the
others.”). See also Kortum v. Johnson, 2008 ND 154, ¶ 44, 755 N.W.2d 432, 447.
29. Egeland, ¶ 10, 616 N.W.2d at 864.
30. Id. ¶ 16, 616 N.W.2d at 866 (citing Shown v. Getty Oil, 645 S.W.2d 555, 560 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1982)).
31. Id. (citing SMK Energy Corp. v. Westchester Gas Co., 705 S.W.2d 174, 176 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1982)).
32. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-08(1) (2014) (stating that “[o]perations incident to the
drilling of a well upon any portion of a spacing unit covered by a pooling order must be deemed,
for all purposes, the conduct of such operations upon each separately owned tract in the drilling
unit by the several owners thereof. That portion of the production allocated to each tract included
in a spacing unit covered by a pooling order must, when produced, be deemed for all purposes to
have been produced from such tract by a well drilled thereon.”).
33. West v. Alpar Res., Inc., 298 N.W.2d 484, 490-91 (N.D. 1980).
34. Egeland, ¶ 17, 616 N.W.2d at 866 (citing Shown, 645 S.W.2d at 560).
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under a lease by production from a very small portion.”35 However, the
Pugh clause is also designed to “foster . . . reasonable development of
leased property.”36 While the goal of a Pugh clause is to sever the lease
when the leasehold is comprised of several parts, Pugh clauses can vary
widely in form.37 Nonetheless, a Pugh clause must be explicit in the lease,
directing the division of the lease into several parts and stating that
production on the pooled portion does not constitute production on the nonpooled portion.38
C. EGELAND V. CONTINENTAL RESOURCES, INC.
The North Dakota Supreme Court addressed the applicability of a Pugh
clause39 to lands not committed to a spacing unit most recently in Egeland
v. Continental Resources, Inc.40 In that case, Egeland entered into two oil
and gas leases with Cenex in 1991.41 The leases contained both a
continuous drilling operations clause and a Pugh clause.42 Near the
completion of the five-year primary term, the operator spudded one well in
each of the five units comprising the leases that had been pooled under a
compulsory pooling order from the Commission.43 Egeland, the property
owner and plaintiff, argued that the leases expired on all lands except those
in the Skull Creek unit, which had begun production prior to the termination
of the primary term.44 Egeland argued that the Pugh clause and the
habendum clause were in conflict; he contended the Pugh clause was
controlling since it was written instead of pre-printed.45 To the contrary,
35. Id. (quoting Sandefer Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Duhon, 961 F.2d 1207, 1209 (5th Cir. 1992)).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 867 (citing Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Scheib, 726 F.2d 614, 615-16 (10th Cir.
1984)).
39. One commentator argues that the Egeland court actually addressed a “retained-acreage”
or “continuous-development” clause as opposed to a Pugh clause. The Egeland clause directly
limits the usual result of the habendum clause as opposed to a Pugh clause, which directly
modifies the pooling clause of the lease. In this note, we will follow the North Dakota Supreme
Court’s language to reduce confusion and focus on the text of the clauses as opposed to semantics.
See KUNTZ, supra note 18, at § 26.12-13.
40. Egeland, ¶ 2, 616 N.W.2d at 861.
41. Id.
42. Id. ¶¶ 3-4, 616 N.W.2d at 862-63.
43. Id. ¶¶ 5-6, 616 N.W.2d at 863.
44. Id. ¶ 18, 616 N.W.2d at 867.
45. Id.; see also N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-16 (2014) (stating that “[w]hen a contract is partly
written and partly printed, or when part of it is written or printed under the special directions of
the parties and with a special view to their intention and the remainder is copied from a form
originally prepared without special reference to the particular parties and particular contract in
question, the written parts control the printed parts and the parts which are purely original control
those which are copied from a form and if the two are absolutely repugnant the latter must be
disregarded insofar as such repugnancy exists.”).
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the defendant lessees argued that the Pugh clause was not in conflict with
the continuous drilling operations clauses because the Pugh clause did not
“address drilling at the end of the primary term.”46
The court agreed with the lessees’ construction of the lease provisions
as not being in conflict with one another.47 The court held that the word
“ONLY,” as used in the lease’s Pugh clause, limited the impact of
production under the Pugh clause to only the lands sharing in production;
however, the word “ONLY” did not mean that the leases could not be
extended by some other means such as a continuous drilling operations
clause.48 In addition, the court held that, contrary to the lessor’s argument
that the continuous drilling operations clause needed to be upheld in each
unit due to the Pugh clause, the continuous drilling operations clause
operated on a lease-wide basis.49 The court was concerned that the lessor’s
interpretation requiring drilling immediately at the expiration of the primary
term within each unit individually would have a “chilling effect on the
covenant of reasonable development implied in every lease . . . recognized
by this Court at least as far back as 1949.”50 The court explained that no
previous holding in North Dakota on the covenant of reasonable
development had ever required simultaneous development in every unit.51
Furthermore, the court was disinclined to accept a result that favored lessees
who were recently drilling—since their entire lease was extended under the
drilling operations clause—as opposed to lessees who had finished drilling
and were now producing, since their entire lease would not be extended
under the Pugh clause.52
III. ANALYSIS
In Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., the North Dakota Supreme Court
held that the Pugh clause of the oil and gas lease severed the lease, quieting
title in the lessor.53 The court divided the analysis into three parts: an
examination of the drilling operations clause individually, consideration of
the Pugh clause individually, and a determination of whether the clauses
were in conflict with each other.54

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Egeland, ¶ 19, 616 N.W.2d at 867.
Id. ¶ 27, 616 N.W.2d at 869.
Id. at 869-70.
Id. ¶ 29, 616 N.W.2d at 870.
Id. (citing Hermon Hanson Oil Syndicate v. Bentz, 40 N.W.2d 304, 308 (N.D. 1949)).
Id. ¶ 30.
Id. at 870-71.
Tank v. Citation Oil & Gas Corp., 2014 ND 123, ¶¶ 32-33, 848 N.W.2d 691, 701.
See generally id. ¶¶ 11–33, 848 N.W.2d at 696-701.
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A. THE COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE DRILLING
OPERATIONS CLAUSE
First, the court examined the oil and gas lease’s drilling operations
clause, which allowed for the lease to remain in force “so long as operations
are continuously prosecuted and, if production results therefrom, then as
long as production continues.”55 The lease also required no more than
thirty days pass between operations on a well and no more than ninety days
pass between “completion or abandonment of one well and the beginning of
operations for the drilling of a subsequent well.”56 Since production
anywhere on the property will generally extend the lease for the entire
property,57 the court was required to define the term “production” because it
was not defined in the lease.58 The court supplied a technical term for
production: “production in paying quantities, that is, production in
quantities sufficient to yield a return in excess of operating costs, even
though drilling and equipment costs may never be repaid and the
undertaking considered as a whole may ultimately result in a loss.”59
Under the supplied definition, the court determined that the lease
should be extended on the entire premises under the drilling operations
clause because there had been a producing well located on the property
during the entire post-primary term period.60
B. THE COURT’S INTERPRETATION OF THE PUGH CLAUSE
Secondly, the court examined the Pugh clause under the lease:
[l]essee may continue to hold this lease in full force and effect as
to all of said lands for subsequent and successive periods of one
year by conducing [sic] additional drilling operations on
undeveloped portions of said lands during each preceding one year
period. Should Lessee fail to conduct drilling operations during
any such one-year period, then this lease shall expire as to said
lands not included in producing units at the end of the one-year
period during which no drilling operations were conducted.61
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. ¶ 12, 848 N.W.2d at 696.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing 8 KRAMER & MARTIN, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW MANUAL
OF TERMS 816 (2013)).
60. Id. ¶ 13. The Tank 3-10 well on the northwest quarter produced until June 1998 when it
was replaced with the Tank 3-10R well on the northwest quarter, which produced through the time
of trial. Id.
61. Id. ¶ 15, 848 N.W.2d at 697.
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The lessee’s argued that the Pugh clause was only operative at the end
of the primary term.62 The court disagreed, finding that the Pugh clause,
when read as a whole, contemplated future one-year periods.63 The court
further acknowledged that the Pugh clause required “additional drilling
operations on undeveloped portions of the land during each one-year
period.”64 Since the lease did not define “undeveloped,” the court was
forced to supply a definition for the term.65 The court held that
“developed” land meant land that had “a completed well capable of
producing oil or gas in paying quantities.”66 The majority of the court then
surmised that “undeveloped” land was “land that does not have a completed
well capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities.”67 The court
found that the lease expressly divided the land into producing units, and
production from a well in a producing unit was not sufficient to maintain
the lease on non-producing units.68
Under this interpretation of the Pugh clause, the court found that the
lease had expired on the southwest quarter of the property due to a lapse in
production and drilling operations on that quarter from October 1, 2008 to
October 30, 2009.69 As of July 15, 2009, the one-year term had expired, the
southwest quarter was not in a producing unit, and no drilling operations
had been commenced during the prior year.70 Therefore, under the Pugh
clause, the court held that the lease on the southwest quarter of the property
had expired.71
C. WHEN IN CONFLICT, WILL THE PUGH CLAUSE OR DRILLING
OPERATIONS CLAUSE GOVERN?
Since the court’s interpretation of the drilling operations clause and
Pugh clause led to opposite results, the North Dakota Supreme Court
undertook an analysis of which clause should govern the conflict.72 The
court stated that allowing the drilling operations clause to govern over the
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 17, 848 N.W.2d at 698.
Id. ¶ 18.
Id.
Id. (citing 8 KRAMER & MARTIN, WILLIAMS & MEYERS OIL AND GAS LAW MANUAL
OF TERMS 258 (2013)).
67. Id.
68. Id. ¶¶ 20-21, 848 N.W.2d at 689-99. The Pugh clause specifically divided the lease into
producing units comprising approximately 160 acres or as determined by the appropriate
governing body of North Dakota. Id. ¶ 23 848 N.W.2d at 699.
69. Id. ¶¶ 22-25.
70. Id. ¶ 27, 848 N.W.2d at 700.
71. Id. ¶ 28.
72. Id. ¶ 27.

436

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90:427

Pugh clause would essentially make the Pugh clause meaningless because
the lease would continue as long as production continued on any well on the
property or if drilling operations were commenced.73 The defendant lessees
argued that the North Dakota Supreme Court should adopt reasoning
similar to that in Egeland, where the Pugh clause and drilling operations
clause did not conflict.74
However, the court maintained that the continuous drilling operations
clause and Pugh clause in this case were different from those in Egeland.75
Primarily, the court noted that the Pugh clause in Tank addressed drilling
operations, while the Pugh clause in Egeland did not.76 Specifically, the
Tank lease provided that if drilling operations were conducted on
undeveloped land, the entire lease was to be maintained under both the
drilling operations and Pugh clauses.77 Therefore, the North Dakota
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s decision, holding that the Pugh
clause modified the drilling operations clause by “terminating the lease on
land not included in a producing unit when additional drilling operations are
not conducted on undeveloped land during the one-year terms after the
primary term expires.”78
D. DISSENT: UNDEVELOPED DOES NOT MEAN
PREVIOUSLY DEVELOPED.
Justice Sandstrom provided the court’s lone dissenting opinion.79 The
dissent disagreed that “undeveloped” land, as noted in the lease, should be
defined using the definition for “developed” land as “land that has a
completed well capable of producing oil or gas in paying quantities.”80
Justice Sandstrom argued that the majority’s opinion seemed to incorporate
previously developed, but no-longer producing land, into a definition of
undeveloped.81
Instead, the dissent advocated for a definition of
undeveloped land or acreage as “acreage not included in producing units or
in units on which drilling has commenced . . . .”82 The dissent believed that
Pugh clauses were created not only to protect the lessor, but also to promote
73. Id. ¶ 28.
74. Id. ¶ 29.
75. Id. ¶ 32, 848 N.W.2d at 701.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. ¶ 36, 848 N.W.2d at 702 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
80. Id. ¶¶ 39-40.
81. Id. ¶ 42.
82. Id. ¶ 43, 848 N.W.2d at 703 (citing Cmty. Bank of Raymore v. Chesapeake Exploration,
L.L.C., 416 S.W.3d 750, 755 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013)).
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reasonable development of leased property.83 Justice Sandstrom argued
that “once a unit of land has had a producing oil well, a Pugh clause relating
to ‘undeveloped land’ cannot operate to end the oil and gas lease with
regard to that unit.”84 Under the dissent’s interpretation, the lease would
have continued, as the Pugh clause could not have expired on the southwest
quarter because it had been previously developed.85
IV. IMPACT ON NORTH DAKOTA PRACTITIONERS
Although oil and gas related claims have come to the forefront of North
Dakotan legal discussions due to the Bakken boom, North Dakota
practitioners often need to look to sister states to determine legal outcomes.
States such as Texas and Oklahoma have a wealth of legal history on oil
and gas that North Dakota often lacks. This lack of information creates
uncertainty in the legal environment. In Tank, the North Dakota Supreme
Court clarified what language is required in Pugh clauses and continuous
operations clauses.
A. WRITING A PUGH CLAUSE AFTER TANK
By upholding the Pugh clause in Tank, the North Dakota Supreme
Court created a safe haven for landowners looking for appropriate language
to insert into their land lease contracts. Because this is the first time North
Dakota has found a Pugh clause to operate effectively, landowners can take
guidance from the severability language contained in the Tank lease as they
draft their own.
First, when drafting a Pugh clause, landowners will want to ensure that
their lease specifically discusses producing units less than the size of the
entire property. The court’s emphasis on the Tank lease’s definition of a
“producing unit” as either a state defined area or approximately 160 acres86
was critical to the court’s finding that the Pugh clause expressly severed the
lease.87 Furthermore, the careful drafter will verify that the Pugh clause,
when read as a whole, explicitly discusses periods beyond the end of the
primary term. In Tank, the court specifically denied the oil company’s
assertion that the Pugh clause only operated at the end of the primary term

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

¶ 43.
¶ 44.
¶ 45.
¶ 23, 848 N.W.2d at 699 (majority opinion).
¶ 20, 848 N.W.2d at 698.
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because of the language in the rest of the paragraph discussing subsequent
one-year periods.88
Lastly, a cautious landowner will consider placing a definition of
“undeveloped” in the lease itself. Since the discussion between the
majority and dissent in Tank centered upon this court-supplied definition,89
drafters can avoid the issue altogether by placing the term in the lease.
Landowners will prefer the majority’s definition of undeveloped: land “that
does not have a completed well capable of producing oil or gas in paying
quantities.”90 On the other hand, it would be in the best interest of oil
companies operating in North Dakota to provide a definition similar to that
of the dissent—where undeveloped land “does not include ‘land in
producing units or in units on which drilling has commenced.’”91
B. INTEGRATING A PUGH CLAUSE AND CONTINUOUS OPERATIONS
CLAUSE AFTER TANK
Drafting an effective Pugh clause, however, is only half the battle
because the Pugh clause must interact with the continuous operations clause
in the correct manner. The critical difference in the court’s analysis
between Egeland and Tank is that the court in Egeland construed the Pugh
and continuous drilling operations clauses as working together,92 while the
court in Tank found them to be in conflict with each other.93 To draft a
Pugh clause that is effective in light of a continuous drilling operations
clause, the Tank decision indicates that a lessor should ensure that the Pugh
clause allows the lease to be continued only if production or drilling occurs
on the non-pooled land. The Pugh clause should explicitly indicate that the
continuous drilling operations clause will not operate lease-wide, but will
be segregated into a pool-by-pool basis. This stands in contrast to the
Egeland Pugh clause, which only required the lessee to fulfill the
continuous drilling operations clause on a lease-wide basis.94 Since the
Pugh clause in Egeland was not clear about whether the lease could be
extended by other means, the court was unwilling to uphold it. Lessor
drafters should pay particular attention to the limiting language of the Pugh
clause and consider something similar to the provision in Tank, which

88. Id. ¶¶ 17-18.
89. See id. ¶ 18.
90. Id.
91. Id. ¶ 44, 848 N.W.2d at 703 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting) (quoting Cmty. Bank of
Raymore v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 416 S.W.3d 750, 755 (Tex. Ct. App. 2013)).
92. Egeland v. Cont’l Res., Inc., 2000 ND 169, ¶ 19, 616 N.W.2d 861, 867.
93. Tank, ¶ 32, 848 N.W.2d at 701.
94. Egeland, ¶ 19, 616 N.W.2d at 869.
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indicated that “[s]hould Lessee fail to conduct drilling operations during
any such one-year period, then this lease shall expire as to said lands not
included in producing units at the end of the one-year period during which
no drilling operations were conducted.”95
V. CONCLUSION
North Dakota’s meteoric rise on the national oil production scene is
increasingly being complemented by an equal increase in judicial precedent
on oil and gas issues.96 Tank’s holding that a Pugh clause that expressly
severs a lease for undeveloped lands and expressly operates beyond the
primary term was the first time a Pugh clause had been held enforceable by
the North Dakota Supreme Court. Tank fills a gap in North Dakota’s legal
regime regarding Pugh clauses in oil and gas leases by providing a path for
interested parties to ensure their leases are enforceable. Parties can easily
contract around the court’s dispute over the definition of “undeveloped”
described in the dissenting opinion by Justice Sandstrom. Tank provides
practical guidance not only to lawyers looking to help clients draft a lease,
but also to landowners with existing leases that find themselves with only a
few operations extending the lease on an entire property. For those
individuals, the North Dakota Supreme Court has provided relief in Tank.
Jesse Liebe*

95. Tank, ¶ 15, 848 N.W.2d at 697.
96. See N.D. DEP’T OF MINERAL RESOURCES: OIL AND GAS DIVISION, ND Monthly Oil
Production Statistics, http://www.dmr nd.gov/oilgas/stats/historicaloilprodstats.pdf (showing that
oil production has risen from 115,142 barrels of oil per day during December 2006 to 1,114,421
barrels of oil per day during July 2014).
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